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This paper tests a number of hypotheses which have been used to explain 
particularistic political spending. Using constituency level data we can better 
evaluate the competing merits of theories predicting whether parties reward their 
voters or target floating or swing voters to maximise the party’s electoral return. We 
also test the hypothesis that the spending decision-making rule is most important and 
may determine which of the loyal or marginal voters are targeted, or indeed whether 
another group might be rewarded. We find that the decision rule is indeed most 
important, and the unusual level of discretion to ministers in Ireland will determine 
where these monies go. This finding adds greatly to our theoretical knowledge of 
geographically targeted spending and is consistent with empirical findings in other 
countries. 
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1.1 Introduction 
The distribution of goods is the essence of politics, and the electoral 
connection with distributive spending is regarded as axiomatic. This often 
means that parties will target distributive spending on collective goods, 
though they may be seen to benefit core groups, such as the middle classes or 
working classes, that the parties in power are seen to represent. Some 
spending will be more narrowly focussed at particular groups, such as a 
specific industry or sector. Given the geographic nature of constituencies, we 
also expect, and do see that some particularistic spending is geographically 
targeted. But the existence, extent and beneficiaries of geographically targeted 
spending are the subject of some debate.  
 
Foremost it was thought that such spending will be higher in countries with 
single member districts, though it might be expected to occur in countries 
using other candidate-based electoral systems which have incentives to 
legislators garnering a personal vote. Despite these theoretical expectations, 
evidence of geographically-targeted spending (hereafter GTS) aimed at 
electoral gain has been found around the world regardless of electoral system. 
Australia (Denemark 2000), Brazil (Ames 2001, 1995), Canada (Milligan and 
Smart 2005), England (John, Ward, and Dowding 2004), France (Cadot, Röller, 
and Stephan 2006), Germany (Stratmann and Baur 2002), India (Dasgupta, 
Dhillon, and Dutta 2001), Japan (Thies 1998; Horiuchi and Saito 2003) to 
Scandinavia (Tavits 2009; Dahlberg and Johansson 2002) among others, all 
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have geographically targeted spending. The absence of empirically-supported 
explanations of cross-country variation1 would suggest the theoretical basis 
for geographically targeted spending is not fully developed. 
 
If the electoral system is thought to cause the existence and extent of GTS, 
then another literature attempts to explain where GTS goes. It has been asked 
whether the key explanatory factor is the legislators’ desire to consolidate 
their core vote or the party’s attempt to attract swing voters. McGillivray 
(2004: 18) argued that the different explanations can be resolved by 
considering another variable, party strength. Where parties are strong, in that 
legislators follow the direction of party leaders, the party will target marginal 
districts so as to maximise the party’s power in the legislature. If parties are 
weak, individually powerful legislators will secure benefits for their own 
districts at the expense of the party nationally. 
 
This assumes that the party or legislators will be the mechanism through 
which GTS is distributed. However, in most parliamentary democracies 
governments are much more powerful than legislatures. Following theoretical 
work on US committees which suggest that idiosyncratic legislative rules 
should help determine where particularistic spending is targeted (Shepsle and 
Weingast 1987), we argue that decision-making structures matter. Specifically 
we test the hypothesis that in parliamentary democracies with weak 
                                                 
1
 There is limited empirical literature explaining the extent of geographically targeted 
spending (Milesi-Ferretti, Perotti, and Rostagno 2002 is a possible exception). 
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parliaments, government decision-making structures will determine the 
direction of GTS. 
 
By adding the decision-rule as an independent variable, we test the rival 
explanations on Ireland, a country whose electoral system, political culture 
and party system would lead us to expect to see high levels of GTS. But 
Ireland’s governmental institutions tend to give a good deal of autonomy to 
ministers. Using data on two programmes, in sports grants and school 
building grants, that are easily linked to constituencies, but which vary in the 
discretion given to ministers, we can see that GTS is potentially neither 
directed at core voters nor swing voters. We find that the institutional 
decision rules account for more variation in the direction of GTS than either 
marginality or party support. Furthermore the variation in the key 
independent variable, the decision-rule governing the allocation of spending, 
varies with that spending. 
 
1.2 Theories of partisan spending 
The literature on geographically-targeted partisan spending emerged from 
work on  localism in US politics, the personal vote and the need to cultivate 
the district (Cain, Ferejohn, and Fiorina 1984; Mayhew 1974; Fenno 1978; Key 
1949). Explanations for pork-barrelling behaviour focus on the different 
incentives among electoral systems to cultivate a personal vote (Carey and 
Shugart 1995). According to Carey and Shugart where the ballot structure 
 4 
allows voters choose between a party’s candidates those candidates have an 
incentive to cultivate a personal vote. Thus the US with open primaries and 
candidate-based voting will strongly incentivise personal vote cultivation. 
Furthermore where the legislature and executive are truly separate as in 
presidential systems, party cohesion will be lower. But if we can explain 
under what institutional conditions such spending should occur, how can we 
explain where it is targeted within a country? 
 
Cox and McCubbins (1986) ask whether politicians direct resources to their 
core supporters, to the opposition or to swing voters and find that politicians 
will favour those voter blocs that promise higher rates of return on their 
policy investment. These higher rates are invariably associated with core 
supporters, easily identified from previous voting behaviour. A different 
perspective, based on persuasion and conversion rather than mobilisation of 
core voters, was laid out by Lindbeck and Weibull (1987), who offer a stylised 
theoretical account arguing for the logic of targeting swing voters they assert 
that the expected electoral return of any given transfer is maximised when 
outlays are directed at swing voters. Transfers to loyal supporters or to 
committed opposition voters cannot be expected to affect voting choices, as 
these voters’ choice is generally between abstention and voting for their party.  
 
Thus there are competing expectations. The Cox and McCubbins model 
predicts that core supporters will be targeted whereas Linbeck and Weibull’s 
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theory suggests that swing voters will be targeted. Both theories have been 
corroborated in different research nd generally results have been mixed. 
Studies of distributive benefits in the US find that parties target pork projects 
to swing districts  (Bickers and Stein 1996; Stein and Bickers 1994), while other 
studies find a bias toward core supporters (Ansolabehere et al. 2007; Levitt 
and Snyder 1995).  
 
McGillivray (2004) potentially resolves these seemingly conflicting 
hypotheses by specifying under which party system each is likely to occur. 
The specific outcome is due to interaction of the electoral system with the 
party type, specified as the strength or weakness of the party or party leaders 
to impose direction on legislators (McGillivray 2004: 45). In strong-party 
systems the electoral organisation is controlled by parties, not by candidates. 
Elected representatives toe the party line, voting in parliament with the party 
when directed. Coalitions are durable and the political actor is the party in 
government. By contrast, in weak-party systems individual legislators are 
more important in policy formulation and are less beholden to their party for 
their political survival. Coalitions are temporary and fluid. The continual 
need to build temporary coalitions means GTS is added to omnibus 
legislation in exchange for support for the core part of the legislation. Weak 
parties lead to the expectation that bills receive support from both sides of the 
House (Weingast, Shepsle, and Johnsen 1981). McGillivray hypothesises that 
in weak-party, majoritarian systems, distributive funds will be targeted at safe 
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districts which elect the more senior legislators. She asserts that legislators in 
electoral systems with single-member districts, where political parties are 
internally cohesive, have incentives and capabilities to target local public 
goods to marginal or swing electoral districts. In Proportional Representation 
(PR) systems where votes tend to correlate with seat allocation, the concept of 
safe or marginal seats is not appropriate. Legislators in PR systems with 
cohesive political parties might target government party supporters, i.e. those 
districts where government parties are strong. 
 
Figure 1: Electoral Districts likely to receive most resources under 
alternative electoral and party arrangements 
 
  Governing Parties 
  Strong Weak 
 
 
Electoral System 
 
Candidate-based 
 
Marginal Districts 
 
Safe Districts 
 
 Party-based Party strongholds Party leader  
bailiwicks 
  
Adapted from Golden & Picci (2008: 273) 
 
 
McGillivray ignored the different impact on incentives produced by open list 
and transferable vote systems, which heighten intra-party competition 
(competition between co-partisans on the same ticket), increasing the need to 
cultivate a personal vote and potentially reducing the impact of national party 
oriented policy, which lifts all co-partisans. Golden and Picci (2008) found 
that, in Italy from 1953-1994, where an open-list PR system generated high 
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levels of intra-party competition and factionalism, the effects of particularistic 
policy were significant and measurable. Their reading of Italian policy 
making suggests that senior legislative figures will direct spending to their 
home districts. Thus they fill the fourth cell in McGillivray’s quadrant 
expecting that party leaders’ bailiwicks will be targeted.  
 
Italian districts in Golden and Picci’s time period are large, with on average 20 
deputies in each and they must aggregate the characteristics of a 
constituency’s MPs. The aggregation strategy may cause problems as it could 
conceal the estimated impact of a senior MP in a constituency if she is elected 
with 19 novices. Nor is there a detailed discussion of how such grants are 
awarded and so we do not get to see whether or why their hypotheses would 
be appropriate. Golden and Picci’s results show that seniority is linked to 
financial transfers as they expected, but they are silent on the causal 
mechanism through which ‘senior’ legislators can direct spending to their 
districts. 
 
The institutional rules that allow pork to be distributed are of utmost 
importance. In the US it was found that legislators in more influential 
committee positions are often more successful in targeting their home districts 
with additional funds, through their agenda setting powers (Shepsle and 
Weingast 1987). And generally we see fiscal transfers are linked to 
institutional rules (Baron and Ferejohn 1989). For instance Hallerberg and 
Marier (2004) found that the decision rule has an impact on budgetary 
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spending in Latin America. But, except in the US, the mechanisms through 
which GTS is delivered are ignored. We argue that these could be of more 
importance than the electoral system incentives. If in many countries GTS is 
given to parliament to deliver, this could increase the power of senior 
legislators. But what mechanisms allow seniority determine the destination of 
GTS? If committees control their delivery, and committee chairs could either 
have an agenda setting or gate-keeping function. In parliamentary 
democracies, the government is most likely to control spending, but again the 
rules of how this is managed will have a greater impact on the destination of 
GTS than the electoral system, whose main explanatory power relates to the 
extent rather than destination of GTS. If power within government is with 
party leaders, then swing districts may receive the bulk of GTS. But if 
ministers have a high degree of autonomy, then ministers may target their 
own districts or those of members of their faction. If ministerial autonomy is 
low and they rely on legislators for the delivery of goods, then they will be 
responsive to legislator demands and might see GTS go to the districts of 
existing MPs or where the party is strong. If ministers rely on cabinet 
colleagues to act, ministers may be responsive to the needs of cabinet 
colleagues. We can see that the expectation in all four quadrants could be very 
different if we vary decision-making rules. If three elements, party type, 
electoral system and decision-making institutions are relevant to the outcome, 
it is the last which may be more important than the others. So even where 
strong parties exist under SMD, marginal seats may be ignored if those 
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controlling the governing structures have no incentive to maximise party seat 
gains. Only by looking at the decision-making structure and the incentives of 
those in decision making positions in more detail can we make reasonable 
predictions about the destination of GTS. 
 
1.3 The Irish case 
This paper argues that both the Irish electoral and party systems provide 
incentives towards a personalized delivery of distributive funds. As is well 
known the electoral system, PR with the Single Transferable Vote (PR-STV) 
incentivises intra-party competition and personal vote gathering (Marsh 
2007). The electoral organisation tends to be local, at the individual level, and 
so government TDs may rebel if their constituency is being subject to specific 
measures which will harm it, and when the opposition puts down motions 
designed to expose divisions in the government parties. Despite this we can 
think of the parties as strong in the sense that TDs (MPs) will almost 
invariably vote with their party whip (Gallagher 2010). Relying solely on the 
McGillivray’s analysis we would expect that GTS would go to party 
strongholds, or those constituencies where support for the governing parties 
is high. As constituency magnitude is small – each has between three and five 
seats and the mode is four – there is a less than perfect proportionality, which 
means it is possible for parties to target particular seats. This means we can 
think of some seats as marginal. If we add the nature of decision-making, 
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however, we may get a different or at least a refined sense of the direction of 
GTS. 
 
A localist political culture and small programmatic differences between 
parties make for highly personalised campaigns. Electoral competition tends 
to manifest itself in terms of promoting and working within one’s community 
and acting as a broker between the constituency and the administrative 
system. This is enabled by the small size of constituencies. Each TD represents 
just over 20,000 people, but in 2007 between 7,000 and 8,000 first preference 
votes were usually enough to see a candidate elected (Gallagher 2008: 79). 
One candidate was eventually elected building on just 939 first preference 
votes, but this was highly unusual. In most constituencies where more than 
one candidate runs for a party, the party will divide the constituency 
geographically (Weeks 2008). During campaigns, candidates stress how much 
they have done for the constituency, while opponents concentrate on how 
particular incumbents have failed to deliver. Local service is top of many TDs’ 
priorities. When asked how strongly they emphasize service to their local 
constituency, 64 per cent of 2007 candidates said that they emphasise this 
service strongly.2 Possibly because of the almost complete absence of policy or 
ideological competition, parties are highly cohesive in legislative votes, so 
party leaders can rely on TDs to follow the party direction (Hansen 2009).  
 
                                                 
2
 Michael Marsh, Jane Suiter and Séin Ó Muinecháin (2008) Candidate Study 2007 
unpublished mimeo. Trinity College, Dublin. 
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Having the incentive to promote one’s constituency does not mean one has 
the ability. The nature of the governmental system means that ministers are 
more able than most to actually deliver government spending to 
constituencies. Ireland is comparatively unusual in that all Irish ministers are 
elected members of the lower house.3 And because ministers nearly always 
defend their seats, ministers will compete with incumbent TDs from their 
own and other parties for re-election. Additionally voters’ expectations of 
ministers may be higher than for backbench TDs for the delivery of goods. 
 
In part because of the overlap of party leadership (in parliament and party) 
with leadership in the executive, the Irish executive dominates the Dáil to a 
greater extent than in most other European countries. But there are many 
formal rules which guarantee executive dominance. Irish legislators cannot 
create temporary coalitions for specific spending because the government 
retains a constitutionally-binding sole power of initiating spending or 
allocation of the state’s revenue (Article 17.2). The government also controls 
Dáil time and the agenda there through the House’s Standing Orders. This 
means that opposition parties or backbenchers are limited to proposing 
motions, which may have no impact except to send signals to voters. For 
instance an opposition party might call for the government to guarantee that a 
certain hospital in an area is not closed.4 Such motions are not binding on the 
                                                 
3
 There is provision for two (unelected) senators to be made minister, but this is almost never used. 
4
 An example of such a motion was voted on in the Dáil on 6 October, 2010. The motion read; “That 
Dáil Éireann, noting with concern: 
— that there are more than 46,000 adults and children on hospital waiting lists across the country, 
which is 5,400 patients more than last year; 
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government, but are designed to force opponents to vote in such a way that 
might be electorally embarrassing. That said, defeat for the government on 
such a motion, or at least one related to a major policy plank, may cause a 
government to feel it has lost the confidence of the Dáil and thus to a general 
election. 
 
Within government, Irish ministers are sometimes considered to be given a 
good deal of autonomy (Farrell 1994). The rules of government decision-
making as set out in the Cabinet Handbook (Taoiseach 2006: 19) necessitate that 
‘[p]roposals requiring a Government decision should be the subject of a 
memorandum from the responsible Minister’. Only the responsible 
departmental minister can make proposals in her area. Other ministers whose 
domains may overlap or have a departmental interest should be consulted 
about the decision. Ministers retain power over appointments within their 
area of responsibility, and these are subject to few or no checks from either 
cabinet or the Dáil (O'Malley, Mair, and Quinlan 2011). There is sometimes a 
requirement to inform the Dáil of decisions made using statutory instruments 
or publish that information in the state gazette, Iris Óifiguíl. 
 
                                                                                                                                            
— that over 272,000 bed days were lost in 2009 due to the delayed discharge of patients; 
— that 50,000 operations have been cancelled since 2007, leaving many patients waiting in pain; 
— the anguish that continues in hospital A&E departments, with an average of 300 patients on trolleys 
each day; and  
— that no further loss of capacity can be sustained; 
calls on the Government to: 
— ensure that there are no further reductions to frontline staff or services; 
— suspend the loss of frontline health services and capacity at hospitals, for example at Clonmel, 
Merlin Park, Nenagh, Roscommon, Navan, Sligo, Letterkenny, Portiuncula, Wexford, Monaghan, 
Ennis and Louth County; and 
— immediately open the €16 million community hospital facility in Dingle, Co. Kerry.” 
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The major restriction on ministerial autonomy is not the Cabinet, which is a 
decision-affirming institution, but the Taoiseach (prime minister), the Minister 
for Finance and other coalition party leaders (for a discussion of the system, 
see O'Malley and Martin 2010). The control the Taoiseach has over the careers 
of ministers ensures that ministers will generally be responsive to his 
direction. The political realities of coalition politics also means that the 
opinions and needs of government party leaders, who are invariably also 
members of the cabinet, must also be met. The Minister for Finance must 
sanction all spending, and does so through the estimates procedure (Finance 
2008: A4, 9-16). This takes place from July each year and is published in 
November, two weeks before the budget. Each minister agrees amounts for 
spending within their department. Gemma Hussey (1990: 12), a former 
Minister for Education, said that the Department of Finance rarely agreed to 
any spending proposal and fought the battles at cabinet level, often on a line-
by-line basis. Finance has some powers to ensure that spending is within the 
‘sub-heads’ agreed by the Oireachtas (parliament), that is, that it funds 
allocated to a domain are spent in the appropriate domain. The Department 
of Finance and its minister is also powerful in the design of legislation, over 
which it has a veto.  
 
Within a ‘sub-head’, once a scheme or programme is established, ministers 
usually have discretion as to where money goes, subject to compliance with 
procedural requirements and departmental advice, the latter of which can be 
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over-ruled. The schemes used in this study are subheads of the estimates, and 
so ministers have discretion over spending, but will be conscious of the need 
to satisfy the Minister for Finance. Crucially there is variation in the type of 
schemes where the responsible minister has much more discretion in sports 
allocation grants than in education grants because education grants are 
subject to specific rules and because the objective need for investment in 
education varies greatly. Furthermore most funding decisions that would be 
typical of GTS in other countries are not subject to parliamentary or even 
cabinet approval, but are completely within the gift of the minister.  
 
Fellow ministers and TDs can lobby a minister to achieve spending in their 
own constituencies. For ministers with leadership ambitions this may mean 
that funds will be transferred to the constituencies of supportive TDs. But 
even decisions which would otherwise have been made can be presented as 
favours to TDs who in turn present the allocation as having resulted from 
lobbying. Letters between TDs and ministers are frequently published and 
presented to voters in election literature. TDs are sometimes allowed to 
communicate the decision to relevant groups and constituents before the 
decision is formally communicated by the government department. The need 
to have prospective legislation approved by cabinet colleagues might mean 
that ministers will submit to cabinet colleagues’ requests. Even allowing for 
these restrictions, ministers will be expected to and so have a strong incentive 
to deliver spending to their own constituency. 
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So where in presidential systems with weak parties, legislators are the 
primary political actors, in parliamentary systems with strong or weak 
parties, the decisive actor is determined by institutional rules as much as any 
other factor. This leads to the following three competing hypotheses for 
Ireland, the first of which we expect to find evidence for: 
1. Responsible ministers will direct higher levels of expenditures or more 
benefits to their home constituencies, and those of other influential 
ministers, the Minister for Finance and the Taoiseach, where they have 
discretion. Where ministers have more discretion, relatively more 
money will be targeted at these constituencies; 
2. Governing parties will direct higher levels of expenditures or more 
benefits to areas of greater electoral strength, i.e. to party strongholds. 
3. Governing parties will direct higher levels of expenditures or more 
benefits to areas of greater volatility, i.e. to swing voters. 
 
 
1.4 Data and Methods 
In general, scholars of particularistic spending have tended to focus on 
infrastructure spending or social welfare policy, or indeed locally targeted 
discretionary grants such as sports grants (Denemark 2000). The 2007 Irish 
Candidate Study reveals the areas that candidates themselves believe they can 
claim credit for. When asked what sort of local benefits are TDs most likely to 
 16 
claim credit for, many of the candidates mentioned more than one category 
and these provide guide our selection decision. Almost 33 percent mentioned 
schools and, in particular, school buildings, amounting to some 22 percent of 
all mentions. Just under that (29 percent) mentioned sports facilities and 
lottery grants, making up about 19 percent of total mentions. Thus, sports 
clubs and schools are the top two areas that legislators themselves believe it is 
worth claiming credit for. This accords with elected TDs’ behaviour in an 
analysis of parliamentary questions raised in the Dáil (Martin 2011).  
 
We use two separate detailed datasets to test these hypotheses, one on sports 
capital grants and the other on primary school building programme in Ireland 
over a sequence of six calendar years from 2002-2007. The Sports Capital 
Grants was set up in 1988 funded exclusively from National Lottery income. 
It was initially a multi-annual scheme, but since 1998 it has been allocated 
annually. For these monies the National Lottery Act (1986) gives the Minister 
for Finance discretion to decide the amount that will go to for each ‘purpose’, 
i.e. sports, arts etc., but these funds are then left to relevant departments for 
disbursal. Since 2005 the scheme is also funded through the normal ‘Vote’ 
allocated by the Dáil for each Department’s expenditure. Though there are 
criteria for the disbursal of funds, these are vague, and the minister has the 
ultimate decision. The fund was soon subject to controversy and there was an 
early (failed) attempt to ensure it was not used for what one TD described it 
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as ‘a re-election slush fund’ (Dáil Debates, 8 November 1988: vol. 383, col. 
2120). 
 
The second spending programme ensures variation in the decision-rule. The 
School Building Programme, administered by the Minister for Education, is 
designed to facilitate the building and refurbishment of school buildings. It is 
administered by the Planning and Building Unit (PBU) of the Department and 
has responsibility for planning education accommodation provision and 
managing the capital funding allocated by the government each year for 
upgrading, replacing and expanding school and third-level college buildings 
and infrastructure. This includes the purchase of sites, provision of new 
buildings (including furnishing and equipping) and extending and 
refurbishing existing buildings. The overall amount is agreed with the 
Department of Finance each year, and the minister for education allocates the 
funds, but there are guidelines setting out priorities for the programme, and 
changing demographic needs will trump most other factors.  Interviews with 
the protagonists involved in these programmes revealed that while this was 
an important programme for TDs, the ability to ‘deliver’ what would not have 
otherwise been delivered was more imagined than real. Because of this we 
expect that relevant ministers’ impact in this area will be lower than that of 
the sports grants where the minister is less constrained. Both sets of grants are 
demand-driven rather than formula-based aid programmes. So recipients 
must apply for grants. We see no reason why this should bias our results. 
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The data used encompass two general elections (2002 and 2007), with up to 
three changes of minister, allowing for some variation in each dataset. The 
data for each scheme are at the level of the individual grant and are allocated 
to the relevant constituency. The data were obtained under Ireland’s Freedom 
of Information Act (1996, amended 2003). The Sports Capital Grants dataset 
contains entries for some 4,444 different grants, amounting to €403 million 
over the period. The data contain the name of the sports club, its address, and 
the amount it won. The Department issued data that break down the grants 
by county. However, in general, constituency and county boundaries are not 
coterminous. Indeed, some constituencies contain two counties, while Dublin 
has 12 constituencies within it, electing 47 TDs. Using a constituency map and 
address information, we allocated each individual grant application to the 
constituency in which it is located. Considine et al. (2008) provide some 
bivariate evidence that, from 1999 to 2007, the counties of the Minister for 
Arts, Sport and Tourism received the highest per capita allocation of Sports 
Capital Grants in all 26 counties, even after changes in office holder. 
However, this analysis was done on the basis of county rather than 
constituency.  
 
The School Building Programme dataset incorporates all capital spending on 
the primary and post-primary education sectors in the Republic of Ireland 
from 2001-2007. The original dataset contains the name of each school, its 
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address, the amount of each individual grant and its purpose. It also records 
the type of school (mixed sex or single sex, type of patron, i.e. church) as well 
as the number of children enrolled. Each individual school is then allocated to 
its constituency – these changed in years where the boundaries changed. The 
data as supplied by Department of Education contained multiple entries for 
schools for the years 2001-2003, where each grant was set out. However, in the 
years 2004-07, each school had merely a single entry. As a result we use a 
collapsed dataset with one observation for each school each year, or 9,399 
observations. In the years 2002-2007 this amounts to primary grants of €976 
million.  
 
Both datasets were then collapsed to per annum constituency level amounting 
to some 255 observations for each programme, (three years (2002-2004) with 
42 constituencies and three years (2005-2007) with 43 constituencies). So each 
observation represents the amount of money spent on the programme in each 
constituency per year. Collapsing the data in this way removes any problems 
with measurement at different levels as the independent and control variables 
are all at the constituency level.5  
 
The central empirical strategy is to regress per capita spending for each policy 
area by each electoral district and year on measures of political factors, 
together with economic and demographic controls that may influence 
                                                 
5
 These two datasets are thus entirely new sources for scholars and will be made available by 
the authors. 
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funding decisions. Stein and Bickers (1994) argue that the number of grants 
rather than the level of grant are a more appropriate dependent variable. 
However, given the structure of the data where any one project can be the 
recipient of a large number of grants, as parts of the project are allocated 
monies in successive years, we prefer to use the overall amount as the key 
variable of interest in this instance.  
 
The variables used are set out in Table 1. Our major expectation is that the 
variables that capture the political actors who control the decision-making 
process will be significant. The decision-rule variables are dummies which 
capture whether the constituency was represented by the relevant minister, 
the finance minister, the Taoiseach or any other cabinet minister. The 
variables designed to test for the party core and swing voter models measure 
the percentage support for the main government party (Fianna Fáil)6; and 
marginality – how close Fianna Fáil as to winning or losing a seat.7 
 
In addition, we control for the various socio-demographic features of the 
constituencies in which the investments are made. These include the number 
of residents in the constituency, the proportion of the population under 18, 
and voter turnout. Unemployment expressed in terms of the proportion of 
adults registered as unemployed and the proportion of adults educated to a  
                                                 
6
 We excluded small coalition parties because they are captured by the cabinet minister variable. When 
included in the model they were not shown to be significant. 
7
 Other variables, the Fianna Fáil seat proportion and whether Fianna Fáil had lost or gained a seat in 
the constituency were also used, but these were not significant and were removed because of 
multicollinearity.  
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Table 1: Variables in the analysis 
Variable 
name 
Description  Unit of 
measurement  
Expectation 
(direction/ 
significance) 
    
Ln Grant Logged Grant allocation 
for each constituency by 
year 
€Ln per 
constituency 
n/a 
Core support    
FF Vote Vote for Fianna Fáil (FF - 
governing party) 
Raw 
percentage 
+/ ns 
    
Marginal seats    
Swing Absolute value of 
difference between 
number of seats and 
number of quotas. The 
higher the figure the 
more unsecure the seat/ 
or closer to a target seat 
Interval data 
between 0 and 
1. 
+/ ns 
    
Decision-rule    
Ed Min Is this the education 
minister’s constituency? 
1/0 dummy +/ s 
Sport Min Is this the sport minister’s 
constituency? 
1/0 dummy +/s 
Taoiseach Is this the Taoiseach’s 
constituency? 
1/0 dummy +/ s 
Fin Min Is this the Finance 
ministers 
1/0 dummy +/ s 
Cab Min Is this any other cabinet 
minister’s constituency? 
1/0 dummy ns 
Control    
Urban Does the constituency 
contain a city? 
1/0 dummy -/ns 
Turnout Turnout at previous 
elections 
Percentage  +/ns 
Education Percentage educated only 
to age 15 
Percentage -/ns 
Unemploy Numbers unemployed Raw numbers ns 
Under18 Numbers under 18? Raw numbers +/s 
Pop  Population of 
constituency 
Raw numbers -/ s 
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minimal level are included, as is a dummy variable denoting whether a 
constituency is urban or rural. All Dublin constituencies and those with large 
urban areas in Cork, Limerick and Galway are all coded as urban. This is to 
capture whether rural ministers are likely to respond different to demands for 
particularistic goods than urban ministers as Considine et al. (2008) implied. 
 
1.5 Estimation and Results 
We present results of two sets of models, one spending on sports as the 
dependent variable and the other with money spent on schools buildings as 
the dependent variable.8 The main independent variables of theoretical 
interest are those measuring the political influence of legislators in 
constituencies, these are the dummies for the Minister for Finance and 
Minister for Education or Sports as well as the dummy for all Cabinet 
Ministers as a whole. Also of interest is that which measures the strength of 
the governing party’s vote in each constituency thus testing the core voter 
hypothesis. A variable which captures the swing voter hypothesis is included 
(see description in Table 1).  
 
The expectation is that the signs on the variables measuring the powerful 
cabinet ministers will be positive (see Table 1). The hypotheses are tested 
cumulatively, so GTS directed at core voters, or party strongholds is tested 
first for its significance on its own; then the marginal voter hypothesis is 
                                                 
8
 Visual inspection implied that the model suffers from non-constant variance of the residuals. Thus we 
report robust (Huber/White) standard errors, as these are less likely to mislead about the significance of 
the independent variables. We utilise the log of the grant variable as the data is  skewed by outliers 
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tested, following by the decision-rule hypothesis. All three competing 
hypotheses are then tested against each other. Results appear as Columns 1, 2, 
3 and 4 respectively in Tables 2 and 3.  
Table: 2  Partisan spending effects on sports grants 2002-2007 (dep 
Variable Log of Grant) 
 
VARIABLES Core Swing Decision All 
FF Vote 0.000555   -0.00149 
 (0.00572)   (0.00605) 
Swing  0.0453  -0.219 
  (0.168)  (0.172) 
Sports Minister   0.885*** 0.991*** 
   (0.155) (0.187) 
Finance Minister   0.631*** .665*** 
   (0.147) (0.157) 
Prime Minister   0.17 0.118 
   (0.197) (0.210) 
Cabinet Minister   -0.143 -0.142 
   (0.0867) (0.0882) 
Under 18 Pop (pc) 1.393 1.436 1.809 1.696 
 (1.469) (1.393) (1.511) (1.563) 
Education until 16 0.0041 0.0044 0.0028 0.0026 
 (0.00752) (0.00799) (0.00855) (0.00851) 
Population  0.0001*** 0.00011*** 0.00012*** 0.00011*** 
 (1.59e-06) (1.57e-06) (1.56e-06) (1.55e-06) 
Unemployment (pc) 4.511 4.531 6.524 6.292 
 (4.530) (4.746) (5.070) (5.040) 
Turnout  -0.0004 -0.0005 -0.0015 -0.0017 
 (0.00937) (0.00918) (0.00925) (0.00947) 
Urban Rural 0.0237**   0.233**    0.19* 0.204* 
 (0.115) (0.119) (0.114) (0.117) 
Constant 12.49*** 12.48*** 12.37*** 12.55*** 
     
Observations 255 255 255 255 
R-squared 0.289 0.289 0.352 0.357 
Robust standard errors in parentheses 
*** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1 
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Examining first sports grants in Table 2, the variable measuring the 
percentage constituency vote for the governing party is not statistically 
significant. Another variable testing the core voter model proposed by Cox 
and McCubbins, the governing party’s proportion of seats in the constituency, 
was also used (not reported) but was not significant. This is perhaps not 
surprising as Ireland has reasonably strong, unified parties, so McGilivray 
would expect GTS would be targeted at marginal constituencies. Of the 
control variables, the population is highly significant and positive, which 
indicates that larger constituencies attract more pork, presumably because 
they apply for more grants.  
 
Model 2 tests the marginal voter hypothesis proposed by Linbeck and 
Weibull. The variable measuring marginality is also insignificant. This is 
surprising in that neither of the standard explanations appear to be important 
in accounting for the variation in the amount of GTS delivered to individual 
constituencies in particular years. Our theoretical expectations are that the 
decision rule is most important: Model 3 tests for this with dummy variables 
for the relevant ministers. The results are both positive and highly significant 
and the model shows constituencies of the decision-making ministers do 
significantly better than other constituencies. Recall that these data include 
changes in personnel in both departments, and controls for demographic 
variables. So the explanation is unlikely due to an idiosyncratic minister or 
that that their constituencies were most needy. The sign relating to their other 
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colleagues in cabinet is not significant, which is not surprising as ministers 
may equally want to respond to demands from backbenchers. This provides 
evidence against any idea of cabinet log-rolling; a pattern that persists in the 
full model. Thus there is strong corroborating evidence for the hypothesis that 
the interests of the individually powerful ministers will prevail over those of 
the party as a whole.  
Table: 3  Partisan spending effects on education grants 2002-2007 (Dep var: Log 
of Grant) 
 
VARIABLES Core Swing    Decision All 
FF Vote 0.000799   -0.00154 
 (0.00666)   (0.00683) 
Swing   0.443**  0.503** 
  (0.198)  (0.199) 
Education minister   0.343* 0.361* 
   (0.178) (0.189) 
Finance minister    0.706*** 0.662*** 
   (0.174) (0.162) 
Prime Minister    0.384 0.553 
   (0.342) (0.352) 
Cabinet minister   -0.117 -0.141 
   (0.100) (0.103) 
Under 18 pop. 5.748*** 6.072*** 5.448*** 6.058*** 
 (1.738) (1.677) (1.800) (1.815) 
Education until 16 -0.00176 -0.000521 -0.000300 0.00152 
 (0.0106) (0.01000) (0.0110) (0.0109) 
Population  1.21e-05*** 1.25e-05*** 1.17e-05*** 1.22e-05*** 
 (1.86e-06) (1.82e-06) (1.90e-06) (1.86e-06) 
Unemployment  5.093 6.004 5.496 5.625 
 (5.560) (5.297) (5.983) (5.986) 
Turnout  -0.0105 -0.0112 -0.00375 -0.00445 
 (0.0102) (0.00991) (0.0105) (0.0104) 
Urban/Rural -0.0192 -0.0498 -0.0805 -0.116 
 (0.121) (0.119) (0.121) (0.121) 
Constant 12.60*** 12.36*** 12.29*** 11.98*** 
     
Observations 255 255 255 255 
R-squared 0.281 0.296 0.309 0.327 
Robust standard errors in parentheses 
*** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1 
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One of the control variables, urban, is significant in earlier models, suggesting 
that GTS is targeted at urban area, something which surprises us as 
anecdotally people suggest rural TDs are better at delivering grants, and 
Monroe and Rose (2002) argue that urban interests tend to be worse at 
translating political support into effective representation. This significance 
falls away in the models including dummies for the main decision-makers’ 
constituencies. Other control variables, such as unemployment rate, under-18 
population or turnout are not significant. One interesting if unsurprising 
aspect is that the dummies controlling for each year of the programme show 
that much more money is spent in elections years or the year coming up to an 
election, whereas significantly less is spend in mid-term years. 
 
Table 3 reports the same models for primary schools capital spending. Here 
we again use the log of the grant because the original dependent variable is 
not normally distributed. This is because certain areas which have seen large 
demographic changes (particularly newer suburbs of Dublin) have had new 
schools built which means these constituencies had greater need for large 
capital grants from this programme. Again there is no evidence for the core 
voter model on its own or in the full model. The swing model presents a more 
conventional picture with areas with a larger swing in the vote for the 
governing party receiving more monies. Once again the evidence for the 
decision-rule hypothesis is strong with the key decision-making ministers’ 
constituencies receiving additional funds, the finance minister with strong 
significance, but the education minister falling short at the .05 level. This 
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evidence is explicable in that we vary the decision-rule (the level of 
ministerial discretion), so we are not surprised to see the responsible 
ministers’ ability to target their own area dropping. The finance ministers’ 
constituencies are targets for significantly more funding. A marginal 
constituency is of some importance in explaining the destination of such 
funding.  In fact here we see that the under 18 population is most important, 
showing that Irish ministers have to respond to needs caused by demographic 
changes. We can also compare the standardised beta coefficients across 
models; the sports minister accounts for a quarter of a standard deviation 
change in sports grant allocations, whereas the education minister only 
accounts for about eight per cent.  
 
In terms of the raw amount of funding delivered (using unlogged grant 
allocations) we can see in the full sports model that the constituency of the 
Finance Minister can expect some €1.25 million in additional funding each 
year while the constituency of the Minister for Arts, Sport & Tourism can 
expect almost €600,000. In contrast the constituency of other cabinet ministers 
will generally receive over €140,000 less in sports capital funding. In primary 
school capital funding the constituency of the Minister for Education will 
receive about €1 million in additional annual funding while the constituency 
of the Minister for Finance will receive about €3.5 million additional funds.9 
 
                                                 
9
 These figures derive from an analysis of the raw amount of funds as the dependent variable as in the 
sports model. We report these figures as it is difficult to interpret the log derived coefficients in the 
table above. Both models produced similar results with only small changes in significance levels. 
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1.6 Discussion 
Pork-barrel politics is thought of as the product of opportunity structures and 
incentives in the electoral and party systems within which parties and 
individual politicians seek to win and maintain power. Many works tend to 
disregard the decision-making rules or have simplifying assumptions with 
regard to them. The Irish candidate-centred electoral system, strong party 
unity and its localist political culture make it an ideal case for testing theories 
of partisan particularistic spending. There are reasons to expect GTS is 
important and that everything else being equal this would be targeted at 
marginal constituencies. But Ireland also has a dominant executive (controlled 
by the governing parties) with ministers who are all legislators seeking re-
election. There are strong competing incentives for spending, so where it ends 
up is of theoretical interest. The result is that, GTS is sometimes in the gift of 
the powerful politicians or ministers who control the decision-making 
structures and are not primarily used as rewards or carrots for party 
supporters. Because we have two types of programmes which vary in the 
discretion given ministers we can further test if the decision rule is important. 
Thus we can say, at least in this area, the interests of individual ministers 
trump the interests of the ruling party. Other legislators are only able to signal 
to voters that they had influence though the use of parliamentary questions. 
This of course leaves open the question of whether delivery such funds is 
associated with garnering more votes at subsequent elections than rival 
candidates from the same party who do not have the ability to distribute pork 
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locally. Another puzzle is why the parties do not act in a more concerted 
effort to maximise seat share. These are obvious next steps in further research.  
 
Having studied the geographic distribution of resources to Irish 
constituencies from 2002-2007 we find that districts which elect powerful 
decision making cabinet ministers win additional capital investments. 
However, the governing party is not always successful at winning additional 
funds for their core voters or for the districts which elect non-decision-making 
ministers. Thus the decision-rules for the allocation of resources are the first 
factor that scholars should look at. Only when these have been taken into 
account can we assess the validity of studies testing whether core or swing 
voters are the primary target of partisan spending. 
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